Institutional Mediation of United States Grand Strategy in Defence Policy-Making in Botswana

Abstract

This study examines how the United States grand strategy is mediated within defence policy-making in Botswana. It addresses a key debate in International Relations on whether external strategic actors directly shape defence policy outcomes or whether their influence is filtered through domestic institutional structures in small states. The study advances the argument that grand strategic influence is not linear, but institutionally mediated through domestic political and bureaucratic arrangements. A convergent mixed-methods design is employed, combining survey data from 51 respondents with qualitative interviews from defence and policy actors. The analysis focuses on actors, institutions, and norms to assess how external influence is processed within Botswana’s defence policy system. Findings show strong executive centralization, with the Presidency as the primary decision-making authority, while the Ministry of Defence and the Botswana Defence Force play advisory and implementation roles. The United States influence is present but indirect, operating through defence diplomacy mechanisms such as training, joint exercises, and doctrinal exposure. These channels shape capacity and professional exposure rather than policy direction. Institutionally, Botswana demonstrates moderate to strong administrative capacity, but limited strategic planning depth and an absence of a consolidated defence policy framework. Normatively, civil–military relations are stable and professional, with external norms selectively absorbed rather than fully transforming domestic practices. The study contributes to theory by demonstrating that grand strategy influence is conditionally mediated rather than directly exercised. It introduces institutional mediation as a mechanism explaining how small states filter external strategic pressures while maintaining policy autonomy.