

Effectiveness of the Public Procurement Act on State and Local Government Construction Projects in Yobe State, Nigeria

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ABSTRACT

Enacted in 2007 upon World Bank recommendation, Nigeria's Federal Public Procurement Act established a mandatory framework to ensure transparency, competition, and value for money in public procurement. Adhering to this mandate, Yobe State enacted its Public Procurement Law in 2016, covering the state government and its 17 local government areas. This study examines the effectiveness of the law on state and local government construction projects, utilizing questionnaires from 320 participants selected through a purposive, maximum variation sampling technique. Seven construction success factors identified in the law were analyzed based on field data, which showed high internal consistency (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.865$). The analysis yielded an overall weighted mean score of 2.25 on a 4-point Likert scale, indicating overwhelming dissatisfaction with the law's effectiveness on state and local government construction projects in Yobe state. Regarding the seven factors, the study revealed that construction delivery suffers from high bureaucratic inefficiency and lack of transparency (71.43% dissatisfaction), irregular issuance of certificate of no objection (79.07% dissatisfaction), and poor regulatory compliance (73.95% dissatisfaction). This exists despite moderate satisfaction (66.28%) in the payment of mobilization fees and some level of satisfaction (57.98%) in final project delivery. Conversely, contractors were found wanting in the presentation of bid security (83.72% dissatisfaction) and performance guarantee (79.07% dissatisfaction). The study concludes that the law is largely ineffective on state and local government construction projects in Yobe State. Consequently, it recommends strengthening regulatory oversight, digitizing procurement processes for enhanced transparency, and training procurement officers on mandatory legal compliance.

Keywords: Public Procurement Act, Effectiveness, State and Local Government Construction Projects, Yobe State

INTRODUCTION

General Introduction

Public procurement is the process by which government bodies and public entities purchase goods, works, and services from private companies (Uwaoma, 2025; Solomon, 2024). These are items required for effective and smooth running of the entities. This means, public procurement serves as one of the vital processes of service delivery in governance. In fact, public procurement plays critical role in governance and economic development, especially in developing countries where it represents a significant portion of government expenditure (Uwaoma, 2025; Asogwa & Obetfa, 2022). In these economies, public procurement claims substantial percentage of annual budgets, often amounting to 30% - 50% of total government expenditure and approximately 15% - 20% of GDP ((Uwaoma, 2025). It is also argued that public procurement is the largest area of government expenditure after salary payments (Asogwa and Obetfa, 2022; Nnebuife et al, 2025). In addition to the provision of infrastructure, public procurement generates significant employment opportunities for the citizens (Uwaoma, 2025; Nnebuife et al, 2025). It is therefore clear that, an effective and transparent procurement process in a country engenders economic growth, reduces social inequality, and serves as a tool for achieving environmental protection in the best possible ways.

Public Procurement Laws in Nigeria

Despite the enormous fund the government spends on efficient procurement of goods, works, and services, the public procurement system in Nigeria has come under criticisms in the media and literature for being a fertile ground for various corrupt practices. (Shalliams & Andrew, 2021; Masoud, 2023). This scenario dates back to the 1960s and was used to justify every military coup in the country. Since returning to democracy, the fight against corruption has topped the agenda of every administration in Nigeria with little or no significant improvement (Asogwa and Obetfa, 2022; Masoud, 2023). In reality, systemic corruption continues to have a devastating effect on all facets of Nigerian society, most notably on the efficiency of public procurement system which is generally considered as opaque, resulting in non-competitive, discretionary contract awards that favor politically connected individuals, fueling corruption and producing poor-quality, inflated-cost projects (Asogwa and Obetfa, 2022; Igwe et al, 2021).

In 1999 however, the World Bank conducted what is known as a Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR) of the Nigerian Public Procurement System and identified critical gaps in the system (World Bank, 2000). It was found that there were no standard laws, policies, or standards regulating how government contracts were awarded and, as a result, the public procurement arena has become a breeding ground for fraud and mismanagement in the country. Consequently, the report recommended for Nigeria to establish a comprehensive and rigorous legal structure to govern the public procurement system in the country (World Bank, 2000; Ifejika, 2020; Kipo-Sunyehzi et al, 2024; Uwaoma, 2025).

In response, the Federal Government of Nigeria passed the Federal Public Procurement Act in 2007. It is a comprehensive legal document designed to promote transparency, accountability, openness, operational viability, and cost effectiveness in all facets of public procurement at the federal level in Nigeria (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2007; Augutine et al, 2024). Having enacted the Act, the Federal Government further mandated all states in the federation to pass a state-level model of the Act (Nwatu et al, 2022; Afolabi et al, 2022). In compliance, the Yobe State Government passed the Yobe State Public Procurement Law in 2016 (Yobe State Government, 2016, Aji et al, 2023).

Aim and Objectives

The primary aim of this study is to assess the effectiveness of the Yobe State Public Procurement Law regarding state and local government construction projects in Yobe State, with a view to identifying areas of setback. Its objectives are:

1. To evaluate the effectiveness of the Yobe State Public Procurement Law in the management of state and local government construction projects,
2. To identify the challenges and setbacks hindering the successful implementation of the Law,
3. To establish potential remedies to overcome the identified areas of setbacks, and
4. To recommend the best practices for enhancing the implementation of the Law on state and local government construction projects within the state.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The 2007 Federal Public Procurement Act

According to Uwaoma (2025), the Public Procurement Act 2007 establishes the legal and institutional framework for federal procurement in Nigeria, regulating the acquisition of goods, works, and services. Enacted by the National Assembly to ensure transparency and value for money, it created the National Council on Public Procurement (NCPP) and the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP).

Key Aspects of the Act:

Establishment & Purpose: Created by the National Assembly to harmonize government policies, ensure accountability, and ensure transparency in public procurement and asset disposal (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2007).

Regulatory Bodies:

- **NCPP:** Responsible for approving policy, amending procurement thresholds, and appointing directors. Defines monetary thresholds, approves policies, and approves audited accounts of the BPP (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2007).
- **BPP:** Responsible for implementing policy, setting pricing standards, and overseeing procurement processes. Ensures competitive, cost-effective, and professional procurement practices to achieve public value (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2007).
- **Structure:** Outlines the legal framework, code of conduct, and offenses related to public procurement (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2007).
- **Development:** Created through a participatory process involving diverse stakeholders (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2007).

The 2016 Yobe State Public Procurement Law

The Yobe State Public Procurement Law (YSPPL) of 2016 was enacted as a foundational legal instrument to overhaul the procurement landscape within the state, aligning it with the national mandate that required states to domesticate the Federal Public Procurement Act of 2007. By establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework, the Law acts as the watchdog for all public expenditures related to the procurement of goods, works, and services at both state and local government levels. It was meticulously designed to foster transparency, ensure strict accountability, and maximize value for money in public contracts (Yobe State Government, 2016, Aji et al, 2023).

Key Components and Structure of the Law

- (i) **Approving Authority:** The Law mandated the Yobe State Council on Public Procurement (YSCPP) to stand as the approving authority on public procurement in the state. The council is authorized to formulate policies, oversee the implementation of the law, and regulate the procurement processes (Yobe State Government, 2016).
- (ii) **Regulatory Authority:** The Law establishes an independent, dedicated Bureau, referred to as the "Yobe State Bureau of Public Procurement (YSBPP)" or "the Bureau," responsible for monitoring, regulating, and enforcing procurement guidelines (Yobe State Government, 2016).
- (iii) **Applicability & Scope:** The Law applies to all procurement activities conducted by all state-level Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs), as well as all 17 Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Yobe State (Yobe State Government, 2016).

Fundamental Objectives and Principles of the Law

The 2016 Law serves several crucial governing purposes:

- (i) **Elimination of Corruption & Irregularities:** It provides a structured mechanism to eradicate fraudulent activities, procurement fraud, and inflated contract costs (Yobe State Government, 2016; Aji et al, 2023).
- (ii) **Transparency & Accountability:** Mandates that all public procurement processes must be open to public scrutiny, ensuring that public officials are accountable for their actions (Yobe State Government, 2016; Aji et al, 2023)
- (iii) **Competition & Fairness:** The Law emphasizes fair competition among vendors, creating a level playing field that allows qualified indigenous contractors and local Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) to participate (Yobe State Government, 2016; Aji et al, 2023).

- (iv) **Value for Money & Professionalism:** Focuses on the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of procurement, ensuring that public resources are used optimally (Yobe State Government, 2016; Aji et al, 2023).
- (v) **Standardization of Documentation:** Requires the preparation of detailed procurement plans and strict adherence to standard bidding documents (SBDs) and procedures (Yobe State Government, 2016; Aji et al, 2023).

Key Operational Aspects of the Law

- (i) **Amendments (2019):** The Principal Law was amended to include specific members to the Council, such as Commissioners for Works, Health, Education, and Agriculture, reinforcing high-level oversight (Aji et al, 2023).
- (ii) **Disposal of Assets:** The law regulates the disposal of public property, requiring all MDAs and LGAs to follow specific guidelines set by the Bureau (Yobe State Government, 2016).
- (iii) **Procurement Records:** It mandates that all procurement proceedings be properly documented and maintained for audit purposes (Yobe State Government, 2016).

The enactment of this Law demonstrates Yobe State’s dedication to upholding sound financial practices and preventing the mismanagement of public funds. The Law is composed of thirteen distinct parts (provisions), each addressing critical structural issues that historically impacted the public procurement system in the state, comprising sixty sections numbered serially throughout the Law (Yobe State Government, 2016). While Table 1 outlines the various provisions of the Law, Table 2 indicates their corresponding sections.

Table 1: Provisions of the 2016 Yobe State Public Procurement Law

Part	Title of Provision	Part	Title of Provision
I	Establishment of National Council on Public Procurement	VIII	Procurement of Consultant (Services)
II	Establishment of the Bureau of Public Procurement	IX	Procurement Surveillance and Review
III	Scope of Application	X	Disposal of Public Property
IV	Fundamental Principles for Procurement	XI	Code of Conduct
V	Organization for Procurement	XII	Offences
VI	Procurement Methods (Goods and Services)	XIII	Miscellaneous
VII	Special and Restricted Methods of Procurement		

Source: Yobe State Government (2016).

Table 2: The Various Sections of the 2016 Yobe State Public Procurement Law

Part	Section	Title	Part	Section	Title
I	1	Citation	VI	31	Validity Period of Bids, Modification and Withdrawal of Tenders
	2	Interpretation		32	Opening of Bid
II	3	Establishment of the Bureau		33	Examination of Bid
	4	Establishment of the Council		34	Evaluation of Bids
	5	Function of the Council		35	Acceptance of Bid
	6	Objectives of the Bureau		36	Domestic Preference
	7	Function of the Bureau		37	Mobilization Fee
	8	Powers of the Bureau		38	Contract Performance Guarantee
	9	Director-General of the Bureau		39	Record of Procurement Proceedings
	10	Principal officers of the Bureau		40	Two stage Tendering

	11	Other Officers of the Bureau	VII	41	Restricted Tendering
	12	Staff Regulations		42	Request for Quotation
	13	Pension of the Bureau		43	Direct Procurement
	14	Funds of the Bureau		44	Emergency Procurement
	15	Financial Year and Annual Report	VIII	45	Expression of Interest to Provide Services of Ascertained Needs
	16	Legal Proceedings		46	Request for Proposal to Provide Services of Ascertained Needs
III	17	Scope of Application		47	Content of the Request for Proposal
IV	18	Fundamental Principles		48	Clarification and Modification of Request for Proposal
V	19	Approving Authority		49	Submission of Proposal
	20	Procurement Planning		50	Criteria for Evaluation of Proposal
	21	Procurement Implementation		51	General Selection Procedure
	22	Accounting Officers		52	Procedure for Selection of Proposal where Price is a Factor
	23	Procurement Planning Committee		53	Selection Procedure where Price is not a Factor
	24	Tenders Board		IX	54
25	Prequalification of bidders	55	Administrative Review		
VI	26	Open Competitive Bidding	X	56	Disposal of Public Property
	27	Invitation Bidding		57	Planning of Proposal
	28	Bid Security	XI	58	Code of Conduct for Public Procurement
	29	Submission of Bid	XII	59	Offences Relating to Public Procurement
	30	Objection of Bid	XIII	60	Miscellaneous

Source: Yobe State Government (2016)

YSPPL and Public Construction Procurement

This subsection identifies the areas of the Yobe State Public Procurement Law that directly affect transparency, accountability, efficiency, openness in public construction project procurement,

Transparency, competitiveness, and openness

In section 18, subsection 1(c-g), the law indicated that all public procurement must be conducted:

- “(c) by open competitive bidding;
- (d) in a manner which is transparent, timely and equitable for ensuring accountability and conformity with this law and regulations made there from;
- (e) with the aim of achieving value for money and fitness for purposes;
- (f) in a manner which promotes competition, economy and efficiency; and
- (g) in accordance with the procedures and timeline laid down in this law and as may be specified by the Bureau from time to time.”

To further stress its commitment to open competitive bidding, the law stated in section 26 (1) that:

- “(1) Except as provided by this law, all procurement of goods and competitive works by all procuring entities shall be conducted by open bidding.”

Section 21 (a) also directed that, procurement entities should:

“(a) advertise and solicit for bids in accordance with the provisions of this law and guidelines as may be issued by the Bureau from time to time.”

To further strengthen the principle of openness in procurement procedures, the law mandated via section 27(2) that:

“(2) Every invitation to an open competitive bid shall

(a) in the case of goods and works under international competitive bidding, the invitation for bids shall be advertised in at least two national newspapers and one relevant internationally recognized publication, any official websites of the procuring entity and the Bureau as well as the procurement journal not less than six weeks before the deadline for submission of the bids for the goods and works;

(b) in the case of goods and works valued under National competitive bidding, the invitation for bids shall be advertised on the notice board of the procuring entity, any official website of the procuring entity, at least two national newspapers and in the procurement journal not less than six weeks before the deadline for submission of the bids for the goods and works.”

Efficiency and Standard of Procurement Delivery

In section 18, subsection 6, the YSPPL appeared very meticulous on the efficiency and standard of procurement projects, thus:

“18. (6) All bidders, in addition to the requirements contained in any solicitation documents, shall:

(a) possess the necessary:

(i) professional and technical qualifications to carry out particular procurements;

(ii) financial capability;

(iii) equipment and other relevant infrastructure;

(iv) shall have adequate personnel to perform the obligations of the procurement contract;

(b) possess the legal capacity to enter into the procurement contract;

(c) not be in receivership, the subject of any form of insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings or the subject of any form of winding up petition or proceedings;

(d) have fulfilled all its obligations to pay taxes, pensions and social security contributions;”

The foregoing section signifies that, beyond meeting technical and professional requirements, every supplier, contractor, and service provider must demonstrate financial stability to secure a Yobe State contract.

Certificate of No objection

Certificate of No Objection, is the cornerstone of the 2016 Law. It is a mandatory requirement for Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and Local Government Areas (LGAs) to obtain a “Certificate of No Objection” from the Bureau, confirming that procurement proceedings comply with legal standards before finalizing contract awards (Yobe State Government, 2016).

The YSPPL interpreted ‘Certificate of No Objection’ in section 2 as:

“The document evidencing and authenticating that due process and the letters of this law have been followed in the conduct of a procurement proceeding and allowing for the procuring entity to enter into contract or effect payments to contractors or suppliers;”

Section 18 (b) of the law explained that all procurement shall be conducted:

“based only on procurement plans supported by prior budgetary appropriation and no procurement proceedings shall be formalized until the procuring entity has ensured that funds are available to meet the obligations and subject to the

threshold in the regulations made by the Bureau, has obtained a certificate of No Objection to contract award from the Bureau;”

It can therefore be understood from the foregoing sections of the law that no procurement entity should commence any construction project without ‘Certificate of No Objection’ from ‘the Bureau’ and that the certificate can only be issued after the procurement entity has (1) followed due process and letter of the law which include, among others, openness and transparency in bidding procedures, and selecting the best suited individual or firm for the contract, and (2) convincingly ensured ‘the Bureau’ of availability of fund to meet its obligations on the contract.

Opening of Bids

In section 32, subsection 1 and 2, the law stated that procurement entities should:

- “(1) permit attendees to examine the envelopes in which the bids have been submitted to ascertain that the bids have not been tampered with;*
- (2) cause all the bids to be opened in public, in the presence of the bidders or their representatives and any interested member of the public;”*

Bid Security

Bid security is security (Bank Guarantee) that a bidder obtain from an acceptable financial institution and submit with its bid, which states guarantees that the financial institution shall pay a particular sum (according to YSPPL, shall not be less than 2% of the bid price submitted by the bidder involved) to the procuring entity if the bidder absconds the procurement process before the award of the contract. The purpose of a bid security is to ensure commitment of the bidders to following through with the procurement process, up to award of contract, without renegeing on their bids. This ensures the reliability of the bids received, and that planning and decision on the bids are not futile. Section 28 of the law is specifically devoted to bid security on procurement of goods, works, and services (Shalliams & Andrew, 2021; Ingram, 2023).

Mobilization Fee

A mobilization fee is an upfront, often percentage-based payment made to contractors or service providers to cover initial setup cost (Asogwa & Obetfa, 2022). Section 37, subsection 1 and 2 of the law state, thus:

- (1) In addition to any other regulations as may be prescribed by the Bureau, a mobilization fee of not more than 40% may be paid to a supplier or contractor supported by the following:*
 - (a) in the case of State and National competitive bidding, an unconditional bank guarantee issued by a bank acceptable to the procuring entity; and*
 - (b) in the case of international competitive bidding an unconditional bank guarantee issued by a banking institution acceptable to the procuring entity.*
- (2) Subsequent payments shall be as spelt out in the agreement for the works, service or supply.*

Contract Performance Bank Guarantee

A Contract Performance Bank Guarantee (CPBG) is an irrevocable, ‘on demand’ instrument issued by a bank to ensure a contractor fulfills its contractual obligation. If the contractor fails to perform or breaches the contract, the procurement entity can demand compensation from the bank up to a specified maximum amount (Asogwa & Obetfa, 2022; Afolabi et al, 2022). Section 38 of the law states that:

“The provision of a Performance Guarantee shall be a precondition for the award of any procurement contract upon which any mobilization fee is to be paid, provided however it shall not be less than 10% of the contract value in any case or an amount equivalent to the mobilization fee requested by the supplier or contractor, whichever is higher.”

METHODOLOGY

Distribution and Collection of Questionnaires

To investigate the highly sensitive landscape of state and local government construction projects in Yobe State, Nigeria, this study employed a targeted, non-probability sampling design involving 320 respondents. Given that trust-building and in-depth contextual insights were prioritized over statistical representativeness, purposive sampling was deemed the most appropriate methodology.

Key informants, individuals possessing specialized knowledge and direct experience with state and/or local government construction project procurement, were deliberately selected rather than chosen randomly. To ensure diverse perspectives and minimize the risk of bias from a single viewpoint, maximum variation sampling was incorporated, with participants selected from various professional roles within the political and contracting sectors.

Data collection continued iteratively until theoretical saturation was reached, indicated by no new emerging themes in subsequent interviews. Finally, to validate the findings and control for self-selection bias, the information gathered from participants was triangulated with detailed document analysis.

The selected respondents were divided into four groups:

Group A: Construction Procurement Officers in ministries, parastatals, and local government areas.

Group B: Construction Technical Managers, including directors in charge of construction in ministries and parastatals, heads of works in local government areas, and area engineers.

Group C: Accounting Officers, including permanent secretaries in ministries primarily charged with construction delivery, heads of parastatals that undertake construction (e.g., the Managing Director of the Housing Corporation), and chairmen and secretaries of local government areas.

Group D: Contractors at both state and local government levels.

A survey research design was employed, using questionnaires specifically developed for this study as the primary research instrument. Based on the duties and responsibilities conferred upon respondents by Civil Service rules and/or the Yobe State Public Procurement Law, each questionnaire included summary questions covering some or all of the following seven factors identified in the YSPPL as responsible for the successful procurement of a construction project:

1. Transparency, Competitiveness, Fairness, and Openness in Award Procedures.
2. Efficiency and Standard of Construction Delivery.
3. Receipt of Certificate of No Objection.
4. Presentation of Bid Security.
5. Presentation of Contract Performance Guarantee.
6. Payment of Mobilization Fee.
7. General Compliance with Regulations in Procurement Procedures.

Table 3 illustrates how the summary questions were distributed among respondents based on their specific duties and responsibilities.

Table 3: Pattern of Allocation of Summary Questions on Factors Responsible for Successful Construction Procurement Process

FACTOR	GROUP A (Procurement Officers)	GROUP B (Technical Managers)	GROUP C (Accounting Officers)	GROUP D (Contractors)
1. Transparency/Competitiveness	Administered	Administered	Administered	Administered
2. Effectiveness/Standard	Administered	Administered	Administered	Administered
3. Certificate of No Objection	Not Administered	Administered	Administered	Not Administered
4. Bid Security	Not Administered	Administered	Administered	Administered
5. Performance Guarantee	Not Administered	Administered	Administered	Administered
6. Mobilization Fee	Not Administered	Administered	Administered	Administered
7. General Compliance	Administered	Administered	Administered	Administered

The summary questions were structured to allow respondents to rate their satisfaction with the aforementioned factors on a 4-point Likert scale: Very Satisfied (4), Satisfied (3), Dissatisfied (2), and Very Dissatisfied (1).

To ensure robust data, this study employs a mixed-method validation approach: survey reliability is assessed using Cronbach’s Alpha, while quantitative depth is secured through thematic saturation and potential selection bias is countered by documentary analysis. Cronbach’s Alpha serves as a measure of internal consistency (0-1 scale) for Likert-type items, where a coefficient of 0.70 or higher denotes satisfactory reliability (Moser & Kalton’s, 2023).

Table 4: Distribution and Collection of Questionnaires

Group	Administered(n)	Received (n)	Response Rate (%)	Contribution to Total (%)
Group A	80	66	82.5%	27.7%
Group B	60	42	70.0%	17.7%
Group C	80	56	70.0%	23.5%
Group D	100	74	74.0%	31.1%
Total	320	238	74.4%	100.0%

Table 4 summarizes the distribution and return of the survey instrument. Out of 320 questionnaires distributed, 238 were retrieved, representing 74.4% response rate, which significantly exceeds the 30-40% threshold suggested by Moser and Kalton’s (2023). This high margin ensures that the findings are robust and minimizes the risk of non-response bias, which typically occurs when the sample size is insufficient to the population accurately.

Data Presentation

As noted in the preceding subsection, a 4-point Likert scale was employed to measure respondent satisfaction regarding the accomplishment of the 2016 Yobe State Public Procurement Law on State and Local government construction projects. Table 5 details the response pattern across the seven primary factors associated with successful procurement of construction projects.

Table 5: Distribution of Responses

FACTORS	ASSESSMENT	Construction Procurement Officers (Group A)	Construction Technical Managers (Group B)	Accounting Officers (Group C)	Contractors (Group D)	Total Resp
Transparency, Competitiveness, Fairness,	Very Satisfied	2	4	6	10	22
	Satisfied	10	8	10	18	46
	Dissatisfied	40	20	22	28	110

and Openness in Award Procedures	Very Dissatisfied	14	10	18	18	60
	Total Response	66	42	56	74	238
Efficiency and Standard of Construction Delivery	Very Satisfied	8	8	14	20	50
	Satisfied	28	16	22	22	88
	Dissatisfied	16	14	16	18	64
	Very Dissatisfied	14	4	4	14	36
	Total Response	66	42	56	74	238
Receipt of Certificate of No Objection	Very Satisfied	-	4	4	-	8
	Satisfied	-	6	6	-	12
	Dissatisfied	-	20	34	-	54
	Very Dissatisfied	-	12	12	-	24
	Total Response	-	42	56	-	98
Presentation of Bid Security	Very Satisfied	-	2	2	8	12
	Satisfied	-	6	4	6	16
	Dissatisfied	-	20	36	36	92
	Very Dissatisfied	-	14	14	24	52
	Total Response	-	42	56	74	172
Presentation of Contract Performance Guarantee	Very Satisfied	-	2	2	10	14
	Satisfied	-	4	6	12	22
	Dissatisfied	-	22	38	32	92
	Very Dissatisfied	-	14	10	20	44
	Total Response	-	42	56	74	172
Payment of Mobilization Fee	Very Satisfied	-	8	20	24	52
	Satisfied	-	18	24	20	62
	Dissatisfied	-	10	8	18	36
	Very Dissatisfied	-	6	4	12	22
	Total Response	-	42	56	74	172
General Compliance with Regulations in Procurement Procedures	Very Satisfied	2	4	4	12	22
	Satisfied	4	8	6	22	40
	Dissatisfied	32	18	28	26	104
	Very Dissatisfied	28	12	18	14	72
	Total Response	66	42	56	74	238

Data Analysis

As shown in Table 5, respondents rated their perception of those seven factors identified in the Yobe State Public Procurement Law as responsible for the effective accomplishment of public construction projects. Responses were categorized as Very Satisfied (4), Satisfied (3), Dissatisfied (2), or Very Dissatisfied (1). Because the responses are ordinal, the weighted mean (Likert scale analysis) was used as the appropriate statistical tool to determine the overall perception of each group, as well as the perception of the entire sample population regarding the current pattern of accomplishment of state and local government construction projects in the state.

Weighted Mean Score for Each Factor

Likert Scale Mapping

Very Satisfied (VS) = 4, •Satisfied (S) = 3, •Dissatisfied (D) = 2, and •Very Dissatisfied (VD) = 1

Formula for Weighted Mean

$$\text{Mean} = \frac{(4 \times \text{VS}) + (3 \times \text{S}) + (2 \times \text{D}) + (1 \times \text{VD})}{\text{Total Response}}$$

(i) Transparency, Competitiveness, Fairness, and Openness.

$$\text{Mean Score} = \frac{(4 \times 22) + (3 \times 46) + (2 \times 110) + (1 \times 60)}{238} = \frac{88 + 138 + 220 + 60}{238} = \frac{506}{238} = \mathbf{2.13}$$

(ii) Efficiency and Standard of Construction Delivery

$$\text{Mean Score} = \frac{(4 \times 50) + (3 \times 88) + (2 \times 64) + (1 \times 36)}{238} = \frac{200 + 264 + 128 + 36}{238} = \frac{628}{238} = \mathbf{2.64}$$

(iii) Receipt of Certificate of No Objection

$$\text{Mean Score} = \frac{(4 \times 8) + (3 \times 12) + (2 \times 54) + (1 \times 24)}{98} = \frac{32 + 36 + 108 + 24}{98} = \frac{200}{98} = \mathbf{2.04}$$

(iv) Presentation of Bid Security.

$$\text{Mean Score} = \frac{(4 \times 12) + (3 \times 16) + (2 \times 92) + (1 \times 52)}{172} = \frac{48 + 48 + 184 + 52}{172} = \frac{332}{172} = \mathbf{1.93}$$

(v) Presentation of Contract Performance Guarantee.

$$\text{Mean Score} = \frac{(4 \times 14) + (3 \times 22) + (2 \times 92) + (1 \times 44)}{172} = \frac{56 + 66 + 184 + 44}{172} = \frac{350}{172} = \mathbf{2.03}$$

(vi) Payment of Mobilization Fee.

$$\text{Mean Score} = \frac{(4 \times 52) + (3 \times 62) + (2 \times 36) + (1 \times 22)}{172} = \frac{208 + 186 + 72 + 22}{172} = \frac{488}{172} = \mathbf{2.84}$$

(vii) General Compliance with Regulations in Procurement Procedures.

$$\text{Mean Score} = \frac{(4 \times 22) + (3 \times 40) + (2 \times 104) + (1 \times 72)}{238} = \frac{88 + 120 + 208 + 72}{238} = \frac{488}{238} = \mathbf{2.05}$$

Mean Score of the Entire Procurement System

To calculate the mean score of the entire system, all weighted sums are added together and divided by the total number of all responses.

- **Total Weighted Sum:** $506 + 628 + 200 + 332 + 350 + 488 + 488 = 2992$
- **Total Responses:** $238 + 238 + 98 + 172 + 172 + 172 + 238 = 1328$
- **System Calculation:** $\frac{2992}{1328} = \mathbf{2.25}$ **Therefore, Overall System Mean Score = 2.25**

Cronbach's Alpha Reliability Calculation

Formula:

$$\alpha = \frac{k}{k-1} (1 - \frac{\sum S_i^2}{S_T^2})$$

Where k (Number of items) = 7 and (S_i^2) (Variance of each item) has Var (Item 1) = 250.00; Var (Item 2) = 436.50; Var (Item 3) = 370.25; Var (Item 4) = 337.50; Var (Item 5) = 344.25; Var (Item 6) = 370.25; and Var (Item 7) = 282.50

$$\sum S_i^2 \text{ (Sum of item variances): } 250 + 436.50 + 370.25 + 337.50 + 344.25 + 370.25 + 282.50 = 2399.25$$

Total Variance S_T^2 : Calculated based on the total response, the variance of the 7-item sum is **5922.50**

• **Final Calculation:** $\alpha = (7/7-1) (1-2399.25/5922.50)$; $\alpha = (7/6) (1-0.4051)$; $\alpha = 1.1667 \times 0.5949$; $\alpha = 0.865$

• **Final Answer:** The Cronbach's Alpha is **0.865**

Interpretation of Results

Interpretation of Likert Scale Analysis

Interpretation of Scale: Very Satisfied = 3.50 to 4.00; Satisfied = 2.50 to 3.49; Dissatisfied = 1.50 to 2.49; Very Dissatisfied = 1.00 to 1.49.

Table 6 summarizes the key findings from the preceding section using the aforementioned scale.

Table 6: Summary of Results and Their Accompanying Interpretations

Factor Assessment	Very Satisfied + Satisfied	Dissatisfied + Very Dissatisfied	Mean Score	Interpretation
Transparency, Competitiveness...	68 (28.57%)	170 (71.43%)	2.13	Dissatisfied
Efficiency and Standard....	138 (57.98%)	100 (42.02%)	2.64	Satisfied
Certificate of No Objection	20 (20.41%)	78 (79.07%)	2.04	Dissatisfied
Presentation of Bid Security	28 (16.28%)	144 (83.72%)	1.93	Dissatisfied
Contract Performance Guarantee	36 (20.93%)	136 (79.07%)	2.03	Dissatisfied
Payment Mobilization Fee	114 (66.28%)	58 (33.72%)	2.84	Satisfied
General Compliance with Regulations	62 (26.05%)	176 (73.95%)	2.05	Dissatisfied
Entire Procurement System			2.25	Dissatisfied

Interpretation of Factor Performance

(i) Transparency, Competitiveness, Fairness, and Openness (Poor Performance): This factor received the lowest ratings. Out of 238 responses, 170 respondents (71.4%) are either Dissatisfied or Very Dissatisfied. Group A (Procurement Officers) showed high dissatisfaction (54 out of 66), indicating a systemic issue with procedural integrity.

(ii) General Compliance with Regulations (Poor Performance): Similar to transparency, this area is failing, with 176 out of 238 (73.9%) respondents feeling dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. Only a small minority (22) are very satisfied.

(iii) Receipt of Certificate of No Objection (Low Performance): Among the 98 respondents from Groups B and C, 78 (79.6%) are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. Only 8 respondents reported being very satisfied.

(iv) Presentation of Bid Security & Performance Guarantee (Moderate to Low)

Both areas are marked by significant dissatisfaction.

• **Bid Security:** 144 out of 172 (83.7%) are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied.

• **Performance Guarantee:** 136 out of 172 (79.1%) are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied.

(v) Efficiency and Standard of Construction Delivery (Highest Performance): This is the only factor with a relatively positive perception compared to others. 138 out of 238 (58%) are satisfied or very satisfied. However, a significant portion (100 respondents) still expressed dissatisfaction.

(vi) Payment of Mobilization Fee (Mixed Performance): This factor shows a better balance. 114 out of 172 (66.3%) are satisfied or very satisfied, suggesting that while the process is slow or burdensome, the funds are eventually provided.

Cronbach's Alpha Interpretation

The levels of reliability using Cronbach's Alpha are typically determined as follows:

$\alpha \geq 0.9$ = Very high reliability; $0.8 \leq \alpha < 0.9$ = High reliability; $0.7 \leq \alpha < 0.8$ = Reliability;

$0.6 \leq \alpha < 0.7$ = Marginally/minimally reliable; and $\alpha < 0.6$ = Unacceptably low reliability

The calculated Cronbach's Alpha is 0.865, indicating a high level of reliability. The findings imply that the factors are highly related, despite potential gaps in the data where some respondents did not rate items outside their specific, professional responsibilities,

DISCUSSION

Results indicate that the highest levels of dissatisfaction on the part of contractors' obligations are "Presentation of Bid Security" (83.72% dissatisfaction) and "Presentation of Contract Performance Guarantee" (79.07% dissatisfaction). This indicates significant bottlenecks in enforcing the financial security requirements mandated by the law for construction contractors. Another high area of dissatisfaction is the "Receipt of Certificate of No Objection" (79.59% dissatisfaction), suggesting that the Yobe State Bureau for Public Procurement frequently fails to issue official written approval, as required by law, prior to the award of public construction projects in the state.

Conversely, the areas with the highest performance are "Payment of Mobilization Fee" (66.28% satisfaction) and "Efficiency and Standard of Construction Delivery" (57.98% satisfaction). This suggests that once the public construction process is underway, the government meets its financial obligations, which consequently improves contractor performance.

Furthermore, the high dissatisfaction regarding "General Compliance with Regulations" (73.95%) and "Transparency, Competitiveness, Fairness, and Openness" (71.43%) indicates that the construction procurement system is suffering from a crisis of confidence, with a strong consensus across groups regarding poor procedural compliance.

In summary, the procurement system is characterized by high levels of bureaucratic inefficiency, lack of transparency, and poor regulatory compliance, even though the final construction delivery is viewed with moderate satisfaction.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The study investigated the effectiveness of public procurement policy on state and local government construction projects in Yobe State, Nigeria. The analysis reveals widespread dissatisfaction with the current pattern of public construction delivery. Consequently, the study concludes that the public procurement policy has largely failed to achieved its intended goals on state and local government construction projects in the state.

The public construction procurement system in Yobe State suffers from a crisis of confidence driven by high bureaucratic inefficiency, low transparency, and poor regulatory compliance, despite moderate satisfaction with final project outcomes. Key failures include the non-enforcement of bid securities, lack of contract performance guarantees, and irregular issuance of certificate of no objection.

To address these issues, the following recommendations are made:

1. **Strengthening Regulation Oversight:** A specialized unit of the Yobe State Bureau for Public Procurement (YSBPP) should be established within entities that handle numerous concurrent construction projects, such as the Ministries of Works, Housing, Education, and Health. This unit will directly enforce all legal requirements in construction contract procedures within the respective ministries.
2. **Digitizing the Procurement System:** A comprehensive e-procurement system should be implemented across all ministries, government agencies, parastatals, and local government areas. This will enhance transparency, competitiveness, fairness, and openness in the procurement of public construction projects.
3. **Training of Procurement Personnel on Mandatory Legal Compliance:** An annual, mandatory training program should be implemented to provide all accounting officers, technical managers, and procurement officers across the state with intensive training on compliance with the procurement law.

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