Monitoring and Evaluating the Independence of Anti-Corruption Agencies: Political Interference and Institutional Capture in Third World States — Malawi, Nigeria and kenya

Abstract

This comparative research work investigated the issues of independence, political interference and institutional capture on anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) in Malawi, Nigeria and Kenya using a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework. Though the enabling legislation is strong in all the three ACAs, the results indicate that their practical autonomy is highly disenfranchised by structural, political and resource-related shortcomings. The Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) in Malawi has a strong investigative law enforcement mandate that still relies on the Director of Public Prosecutions to conduct a prosecution, which presents a standing susceptibility of being subject to political pressure. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in Nigeria has the broadest legal jurisdiction, including the ability to conduct internal investigations and prosecute, but is severely limited by the executive branch which dictates who gets leadership positions, which cases to prosecute and the severity of the prosecution. An advantage of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission of Kenya (EACC) is that the country has a strong legal system; however, it is evident that the force and its agencies are spread across a chain of command which is disjointed making it slow and open to bargaining with politics. Political interference is found to be a characteristic drawback in all three nations and impacts case proceedings, investigation resolution and political stability. These are manifested in different ways-procedural interference in Malawi, overt executive influence in Nigeria and decentralised political pressure in Kenya, but the effects are the same weakened impartiality, selective enforcement and stalled high-profile cases. Political settlements, elite networks and bureaucratic fragmentation also give rise to institutional capture of each ACA. These dynamics have a significant adverse effect on performance in enforcing the functions and on trust by the population. The research finds that the legal systems are not sufficient as assurance of ACA autonomy. The performance against corruption requires the political insulation, stable budgets, simplified mandate and greater prosecutorial independence. The results are relevant to comparative studies of anti-corruption practices because they show that political and institutional environment affects ACA performance of states in the Third World.